Tactical Analysis: The Pressing Structure that Powered Manchester City past Dortmund

Manchester City’s 4-1 victory over Dortmund in midweek was not just a continuation of their recent resurgence; it was a statement of intent. At the halfway point of this season’s Champions League group stage, the Cityzens find themselves fourth in the table with no defeats from their opening four fixtures.

While Dortmund showed commendable resolve in dominating certain periods of the game and challenging for the lion’s share of possession, one aspect of Pep Guardiola’s tactics rendered their buildup play null and void: City’s pressing structure. As a result of City’s high press, Dortmund was forced to play 48 long balls in the game (via FotMob), comprising over 10% of their total attempted passes.

Long balls are inevitably a low probability strategy considering that they almost always result in 50-50 duels and second balls rather than clear-cut chances and spatial advantages. This meant that Niko Kovač’s side failed to effectually transition from their own third of the pitch to the final third in a consistent and reliable manner, undermining their progression on the ball.

This was not only due to the intensity of City’s pressing but also the structure they maintained off the ball, forcing Dortmund to play certain passing sequences that limited their options. A key element of this pressing structure was seen during Dortmund’s goal kicks.

Dortmund’s Plan in Buildup

Dortmund started with their regular 3-4-2-1 formation on paper, with Nico Schlotterbeck playing as the central defender in their backline:

Their gameplan from goal kicks was not straightforward. Dortmund’s intention was to create an overload in the area behind City’s central midfielders through an incisive inverted run by left wing back Daniel Svensson. Meanwhile, the rest of the back five shifted across to cover for him, which suited Ramy Bensebaini given his career experience as a left back. The wingers held their width rather than remaining inverted, while CM Felix Nmecha dropped down to offer a progressive option at the base of midfield.

Dortmund’s intention was to create a numerical overload between Guardiola’s defensive and midfield lines while providing a dependable pipeline to aim at those areas. However, City’s pressing structure was effective in neutralizing this threat.

City’s Pressing Structure

Pep Guardiola’s strategy to counter Dortmund’s intricate buildup plan was simple yet effective: limit their passing options and force them to bypass midfield, play aerial passes under pressure, and thus often yielding possession. This was done via a 4-1-3-2 pressing structure.

Foden and Haaland were the initiators of the press, starting on the edge of Dortmund’s box. As soon as Schlotterbeck played the goal kick to Kobel to ensure a more central starting point and wider field of view, Foden and Haaland would narrow down the goalkeeper, forcing Kobel to either play a long ball or pass it wide to one of the two centre backs (Schlotterbeck or Anton). The pass into Nmecha in defensive midfield was covered by Tijjani Reijnders.

Assume, without loss of generality, that Kobel passed wide to Anton. Foden would then curve his run in such a way to block the passing lane to Felix Nmecha in midfield, while Haaland would prevent a pass back to the goalkeeper. Meanwhile, Tijjani Reijnders would shift to mark Marcel Sabitzer. The only option left for Anton was a pass down the flank to Ryerson. However, City’s wingers (Savinho and Doku) were positioned to intercept these passes to Dortmund’s hybrid fullbacks. As seen in the figure, all four of Anton’s short-to-medium range passing options were blocked.

The result was that Anton would be forced to play a long ball. Striker Serhou Guirassy would drop down into attacking midfield to challenge for this aerial pass given his commendable hold-up play, with the intention of outnumbering Nico González in defensive midfield (note that Nico was already marking the left wing back Svensson). However, Joško Gvardiol would follow him and challenge for the header. Moreover, numerical overloads matter little when it comes to long balls; it is a case of physicality and desire to win the 50-50 duel.

City’s pressing structure had variations as well. Reijnders’s role often required high intensity as he had to instantaneously switch from marking Nmecha to marking Sabitzer. In the below image, Nico González has advanced to mark Sabitzer to relieve him of this responsibility. As a result, Svensson and Guirassy, who are occupying City’s defensive midfield area, are now marked by the centre backs (Stones and Gvardiol).

The statistics sum up the story. Out of Gregor Kobel’s 29 attempted passes, 16 were long balls with a passing accuracy of 32.5%. Meanwhile, centre backs Schlotterbeck and Anton attempted 13 and 8 long balls respectively. (All statistics via FBref)

Pep Guardiola has received widespread praise over the course of his managerial career for tactical innovation in buildup and attack. However, his defensive contributions are often overlooked. City’s well-executed tactics off the ball subverted Dortmund’s attacking threat and nullified the effectiveness of their midfield. Ultimately, it was the smoothness of their transition from a 4-3-3 in attacking phases to a 4-1-3-2 pressing structure that powered them to an emphatic 4-1 victory.

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